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IN THE SUPREME·coURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FLORA KESLER,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
SHERMAN BRIMLEY TATE and
BURTON L. TATE,
Defendants and Respondents,

Case No.

12806

and

TRANSNATIONAL INSURANCE
COMPANY,
Intervenor and Appellant.

RESPO,NDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is an action by the plaintiff against the defendants, who are uninsured, for property damage and
bodily injury sustained in an automobile collision which
occurred on September 22, 1970.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Although made aware of the filing of these proceedings prior to October 5, 1971, (R. 55) the date of the
filing of the Complaint, the plaintiff's uninsured motorist
carrier, Transnational Insurance Company (hereinafter
1

sometimes designated "Transnational"), did not file its
Motion for Leave to Intervene until January 13, 1972,
over three months later. At the time the Motion was filed
substantial discovery had been and was being completed'
and the case was at issue. A Request for Trial Setting
had been filed (R. 70).
At the time of the Hearing on the appellant's Motion
for Leave to Intervene all counsel were present nnd both
the plaintiff and the defendant were heard in opposition.
Having heard counsel; having analyzed plaintiff's
memorandum of authorities on file; and having rPquired
additional time in which to read the Utah cases recited
in the memorandum, the District Court, J a:mes S. Sawaya
presiding, denied the applicant's motion for intervention. This appeal is from that denial.

1

1

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff-respondent, Flora Kesler, seeks the
affirmance of the Order of the Third District Court
denying the appellant's Motion for Leave to Intervene.
STATEMENT OF F AC11 S
On September 22, 1970, at approximately 7 :41 p.m.,
the plaintiff's automobile was struck from behind by a
large dump truck driven by Sherman Brimley Tate and
owned by his father, Burton L. Tate, or by a corporation
in which Burton L. Tate was a principal. The collision
occurred at the intt>rsection of 1300 South and State
Streets in Salt Lake City. Immediately prior to the
collision the plaintiff was stopped and parked at a
traffic semaphore waiting for the light to change.
2

1

The plaintiff, who was injured, filed a lawsuit against
tlw defendants, alleging that the defendant, Sherman
Brimley Tate, failed to maintain a proper lookout; failed
to properly maintain and control a motor vehicle, and,
further, that he was driving with faulty and defective
brakes (R. 1). Plaintiff also contended that the truck
was negligently entrusted to Sherman Brimley Tate, a
minor, and that his father, in any event, was jointly and
,.;evernll:v liable unuer the provisions of 41-2-10 and 41-222 U.C.A. 1953 a;;; amended. The <lefendants, denying
most of the allegations of the Complaint, answered that
the.y were unable to stop hPcause of the brakes; that
tlH')' were not adequately aware of the defect and that
the collision vvas the result of sudden peril and unavoidable (R. 4).
As a result of the collision, the plaintiff, alleging
serious and pennanent injuries, prayed judgment for
her medical costs and pain and suffering. The action
was filed on October 5, 1971.
On January 13, 1972, the appellant, Transnational,
Mrs. Kesler's uninsured motorist carrier, moved for
leave to intervene, not having been joined in the lawsuit.
The Order denying intervention was entered on January
26, 1972.
Prior to the commencement of the lawsuit, the plaintiff had attempted to settle her case with Transnational
and to arrange for arbitration and, failing in this, to
secure Transnational's consent to the suit against the
tortfeasor defendants (See: R. 48-58). In each instance,
although the requests were, for the most part, specified
in writincr
the plaintiff's efforts met with no response.
bl
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THIS COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY HELD THAT THE
PLAINTIFF'S UNINSURED MOTORIST CARRIER IS
NOT A PROPER PARTY TO THE LAWSUIT BETWEEN THE PLAINTIFF INSURED AND THE
DEFENDANT TORTFEASOR.

In the case of Christensen v. Peterson, 25 Ut. 2d 411,
483 P. 2d 447, two plaintiffs injured in an automobile
accident filed a single complaint stating three separate
causes of action. Plaintiff Christensen filed a cause of
action sounding in tort against the tortfeasor Peterson.
Plaintiff Larsen filed a cause of action sounding in tort
against the same defendant. The two plaintiffs, Christensen and Larsen, then jointly stated a cause of action
in contract against Allstate Insurance Company, the
holder of the plaintiff's uninsured motorist coverage.
The attorney for Allstate Insurance Company in the
Christensen case was D. Gary Christian, who is presently
counsel for Transnational Insurance Company, the intervenor-appellant. It is interesting to note that this
case is not cited in the appellant's Brief.
The plaintiffs in the Christensen case argued to the
trial court that there was an improper joinder of parties
and a misjoinder of remedies. The trial court concurred
with those contentions and dismissed Allstate from the
lawsuit. This Court, on appeal, affirmed the dismissal,
agreeing with the insurer's claim on both points.
4

If there was a misjoinder of remedies and an improper joinder of parties in the Christensen case, it is clear
those same fundamental objections are present on this
appeal. The claim of Mrs. Kesler against the tortfeasor
defendants is a tort claim, while the claim of Mrs. Kesler
against Transnational Insurance Company, her own insurer, is based in contract. In the Christensen case it
was argued that the joinder of the insurance company as
a named defendant would give "an unfair advantage"
to the plaintiffs. While appellant can argue that it is
willing to risk the unfair advantage inherent in the
situation and join in the lawsuit at its own peril, this
argument conveniently overlooks the fundamental objection that this Court has held that tort and contract
actions cannot, under these circumstances, be joined.
If the plaintiff can clearly not join the uninsured
motorist carrier under the Christensen rationale, then
the issue becomes can the uninsured motorist carrier join
itself, when it chooses, under the principles enunciated
in that case. This Court has strongly inferred that the
answer is no. In Christensen, the Court cited approvingly the Oklahoma case of Holt v. Bell, 392 P. 2d 361,
and noted that the Oklahoma Supreme Court had consistentlv held in tort actions when liability insurance was
involved that the insurer could not be joined with the
tortfeasor unless it was a policy required by statute.
This Court then indicated that "The reason for such a

rule is equally applicable where the insurer's obligation
is under an uninsured motorist endorsement, ... '' The
Court quoting from Holt v. Bell, supra at 363, stated
as the central theme of its decision, that,
5

"-When the parties are placed in a position
where the interest of an insurer is to defeat the
claim of its own insured, the position of the
parties is such that the court cannot countenance
tJ.te situation. The placing of the parties thusly
yirtually makes the plaintiff's insurer the liability
msurer of the defendant and interested in defeating plaintiff's claim. Such being the case, under
the holdings of this court, the insurer cannot be
joined as a party defendant."
To intervene "as a defendant'' is, of course, precisely
what Transnational Insurance Company has attempted
to do ( R. 16). The Christensen option serves to controvert the statement of the appellant that it is "unable
to find any Utah cases directly in point dealing with the
question here presented for consideration" unless that
statement is given a very strained and narrow interpretation (appellant's Brj ef, p. 3).
The intnvenhon of the insurance company m the
uninsured motorist situation is as potentially harmful
to the tortfeasor as it is to the insured in the liability
insurance situation. In the uninsured motorist situation,
the tortfeasor is normally ultimately responsible for tlw
payment of any .award despite the fact that the insurance
company may have paid under the uninsured motorist
provisions of its policy. Normally this is accomplished,
if the case is settled prior to trial, by the insurer bringing its claim in the name of the insured as if it \Vere
subrogated to the insured's interest. There is a wide
range of possibilities available to the insurer if this court
were to hold that it could join itself, although it could
not be joined by others. If the case settled, the insurer
6

could bring suit against the tortfeasor in the name of
tlw insured and compel, under the terms of the policy,
the cooperation of the insured. If the insured filed an
action against the tortfeasor, as in this ease, the insurer
could on the intervention theory urged here align itself
against its own insured in its own name, as appellant
seeks to do, or perhaps in the name of the tortfeasor, as
if it were the tortfeasor's liability insurer. If the insured
prevailed, the insurer could pay the amount of the award,
and, in the insured's name, proceed to collect the money
back from the tortfeasor, its former client. ·whether one
th«n finds the insurt>r lurking behind the insured or the
tortf Pasor, or acting in its own name, would depend
npon the circumstances of the individual case. Each
situation, with the exception of a subrogation claim derived from its own insured, involves serious theoretical
and ethical impediments.
To permit the insurance company to join the tortfeasors as a named co-defendant is to permit, as far as
the tortf easors are concerned, the same destructive possibility that the jury will consider the insurance rather
than the rules of law relating to liability and damages
which exists in the liability insurance situation. 1

It will not suffice to say, in this case, that the intervention of the uninsured motorist carrier could be con1 The Court's conclusion that the question of insurance should
not be injected into the trial of a personal injury lawsuit could
not, according to Justice Crockett, be more explicit unless the
Court had said "damn it." Young v. Barney, 20 Ut. 2d 108, 433
P.2d 846.

7

ducted in the name of the tortfeasor without the carrier
being expressly named because:
1. The appellant-insurer requested in its motion that
it be named as a defendant-intervenor and permitted to
file an Answer in its own right.

2. This court in the Christensen case has specifically
denied the joinder of the insurer as a party defendant.
3. The claim of the plaintiff against the insurer derives from contract and is not a tort. Conversely the
rights of the insurer against the insured, if any, are
based in contract. The joinder of two claims, contract
and tort, in a single action under these circumstances
was proscribed by the Christensen case.
4. The tortf easor and the insurer are themselves
potential litigants with inconsistent and conflicting interests.
Conceptually, there is less reason in the case before
the court to permit intervention than there was to permit joinder in the Christensen case. In Christensen, the
court said that joinder of the insurer would constitute
treating the plaintiff's insurer as the liability insurer
of the defendant interested in defeating plaintiff's claim.
At least in that situation the plaintiff, by attempting to
effect such a joinder, has concurred that such a result
is permissible. Surely it becomes, under the rationale
of these two cases, much more difficult to "countenance
the situation" where such a result is imposed upon the
insured plaintiff without his consent.
8

Whether the question is joinder or intervention;
whether the participation of the insurer is requested by
the plaintiff or by the insurer itself, the same fundamental considerations raised to support the decision in
Christensen apply. There is, considering that case, no
logical basis for drawing a distinction between the two
situations. The Trial Court, considering the Christensen
holding, could not have ruled otherwise.
In the liability insurance situation where the Court
has been most emphatic in its exclusion of the insurer
as a named defendant, it is conceivable that an insurer
could be named without harmful effects to interests other
than its own. That is to say that unless the coverage
was inadequate to protect any residual interest of a
named defendant insured, that the only party injured
by th<' jury's consideration of the element of insurance
would be the insurer itself. In this case, however, the
intervention of the insurer in its own right, under its
own name, could be seriously and ultimately injurious
to the tortfeasor with whom the insurer has only a limited
community of interest.
POINT II
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S CONCLUSIONS IN THE INSTANT CASE ARE AT VARIANCE WITH THOSE
PREVIOUSLY URGED UPON THIS COURT.

Plaintiff concedes that argument is argument and
that what counsel had to say on a prior occasion may
have been dictated by the practical exigencies of his employment. The mention of certain contradictory prior
9

conclusions is not intended to embarrass counsel or to
stress, unfairly, inconsistencies between his past and
present positions.
The arguments advancPd in Mr. Christian's Brief in
the Christensen case are eminently reasonable and
persuasive. They were, in a sense, the raw material for
the Christensen opinion and have, consequently, both historical and explanatory significance.
The conclusions of appellant's present counsel in that
earlier case \Vere as follows:
1. " ... before the Plaintiff is entitled to be reimbursed from the Defendant [i. e. Allstate] there must
have been a legal determination that he comes within
the scope of the policy providing for uninsured motorist
coverage. . . " (Brief, Allstate Insurance Company,
hereinafter "Allstate Brief," Case No. 12065, Utah Supreme Court, p. 7).

It was argued that the ''legal determination" required
proof of:

(a) Liability on the part of the tortfeasor.
(b) The amount of the damages.
( c) The absence of insurance.
2. " ... that the Plaintiff mitst initiate legal action
against the tortfeasor to determine the amount of his
damages ... " (Allstate Brief, p. 8).

10

Quoting the earlier Utah case of Barnhart v. Civil
Service Employees Insurance Company, 16 Ut. 2d 223,
398 P. 2d 873, it was argued that,
"Whether plaintiffs are legally entitled to recover from W elcker [the uninsured motorist]
and, if so, the amount of damages could only be
determined between the plaintiffs and Welcker"
(Allstate Brief, p. 8, emphasis supplied).
3. " ... an insured Plaintiff would not be allowed
to join Plaintiff's insurer as a co-defendant in an action
against an allegedly uninsured tortfeasor Defendant on
the basis of un-insured motorist coverage contained in
Plaintiff's insurance policy." (Allstate Brief, p. 8).
4. "It also seems clear that the policy [similar to
the policy in the instant case] contemplates that an action
must be filed against the alleged wninsitred motorist and
the issues of liability and damages and lack of insiirance
must be determined in a separate proceeding
"
(Allstate Brief, p. 9, emphasis supplied).
Concluding that the cases and the arguments sufficiently established the misjoinder of remedies, Mr. Christian then proceeded to indicate that there was a further
compelling reason why the dismissal should be affirmed,
that being the improper joinder of parties. He quoted
from the case of Yowng v. Barney, 20 Ut. 2d 108, 443
P. 2d 846, which indicated that it was prejudicial error
to deliberately inject the subject of insurance coverage
in a personal injury trial. To inject such issues would
give the Plaintiff "an unfair advantage" (Allstate Brief,
p. 10) in that the verdict might be based upon the fact
11

that there is insmance coverage available rather than
upon the rules of law relating to the issues of legal liability and damages.
Finally, summarizing, the Brief concluded:
1. " ... It is improper for Plaintiffs to join in a
single Complaint, causes of action and remedies based
in contract and in tort... "
2. " . . . the proper procedure for the Plaintiffs to
follow in this case is to file their action against the alleged
tortfeasor and have the issues of liability and damages
decided by a judge or a jury or a court of competent
jurisdiction as mandatory conditions precedent to any

action against the insurance company ... " (Emphasis
supplied).

In obedience to those basic precepts, and subject to
the rulings of this Court, the plaintiff proceeded to file
its action directly against the tortfeasors for the determination of liability and damage issues.
POINT III
THE AUTHORITIES WHICH HAVE CONSIDERED
THE QUESTIONS OF JOINDER AND INTERVENTION HOLD CONFLICTING VIEWS.

The appellant has relied almost exclusively on the
citation of authorities from other jurisdictions to support its argument for intervention. The Utah cases
mentioned in the Brief are old and do not specifically
relate to the subject of uninsured motorist coverage.
1~

Many of the nme out-of-state cases cited in appellant's
Brief are, for different reasons, distinguishable. 2
2 Three of the cited decisions were from the State of Georgia.
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Lester
E. Brown, et al, 114 Ga. App. 650, 152 S. E. 2d 641 (1966);
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Glover,
113 Ga. App. 815, 149 S. E. 2d 852; State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company vs. Jiles, 115 Ga. App. 193, 154 S. E.
2d 286 (1967). In State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company v. Glover, supra, the first of the Georgia cases, the
tortfeasor filed no defensive pleadings. The court permitted intervention "where the case is in default as to the uninsured
motorist." This position was later extended. State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company v. Brown, supra. Georgia had
a peculiar statute which the Court relied upon expressly stating
that "The answer is in the construction of the uninsured motorist
laws." Justice Pannell, specially concurring, also confirmed that
the majority "has seen fit to base its conclusions upon a construction of that Act" ... [Ga. L. 1963, p. 588 et seq. as amended
by Ga. L. 1969, p. 306 et seq; Code Ann 56-407 .1]. The same
statute had application in each of the three Georgia cases. It
has no Utah counterpart.
In Matthews v. Allstate Insurance Company, 194 F. Supp.
459, the right of the insurer to intervene was "permissive". As
indicated there,
"Had the defendant appropriately raised the question in the
state court, it is not unlikely that, under the terms of the policy
endorsement, the insurance company would have been permitted
to intervene. . . . That such permissive joinder is proper is evidenced by ... " (Emphasis supplied)
Where joinder is permissive, the grant or denial of intervention is discretionary with the trial court and subject to
reversal only for abuse of discretion. This case does not serve
to support Transnational's basic contention that it is entitled as
a matter of right to intervene. Note that the question of intervention must, in any event, according to the Matthews decision,
be "appropriately" raised.
In Lamb v. Horwick, 48 III App 2d 251, 198 N.E. 2d 194,
there was no written opinion. No facts are recited; no law is
stated and the court said nothing more than that the insurer
should be "permitted" to intervene.
Indiana Insurance Company v. Noble, 265 N. E. 2d 419, as
well as Alston v. Amalgamated Mutual Casualty Company, 53
Alise. 2d 90, 278 N.Y. S. 2d 906, started from a different premise.

13

A careful sm·vpy of th!' cast's \\'hich havp consid<'r1·f\
the question of intervtintion and joindt>r indicates that
the con rts hold conflicting vi(~Ws.

j

In thf' case of Allstate Insurance Company v. Ili111t, :
450 S.vV. 2d G68, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals dPni<'d intervention by the insurer, Allstate Insurance
Company. Before the trial court, Allstate moved that
its identity be withheld from th<> jury. By means of a
motion for severnnc(' Allstate succeeded in obtainin~ '
separate trials of the tort and contract questions. It then
attempted to participate in the trial of the tort claim, in
which it w:is not a named defendant, in a defense role.
The trial court excluded Allstate from the trial of the
tort claim.
(')

The issue on appeal was ·whether or not the insurer
could defend the claim of its own insured against the
uninsured motorist. This was a matter of "first imprPssion" in Texas.
The Texas Court, after specifically referring to six
of the nine cases recited in the present appellant's Brief,
affirmed the trial court citing supporting authority
from a number of jurisdictions. 3 The lead cast> upon
Both Indiana and New York permitted an insured to file his
original action directly against the insurer. To permit the in·
surer then, to intervene, was a mere logical extension of the
Court's first position. This Court, however, in the Christ~ns_en
case, expressly rejected a direct cause of action by the plamt1ff
against the insurer.
sHernandez v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company (La.), 192 So. 2d 679, Kirouac v. Healy, (N.H.) 181 A.
2d 634, other cases there cited.

14

which the Court relied was that of the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Holt v. Bell, supra. Holt v. Bell, of
course, was the case approvingly cited and liberally
quoted from in this Court's earlier decision in Christensen v. Peterson, sitpra.
The Texas Court indicated that a contrary ruling
would result in serious "ethical" problems between the
insurer, its insured and the uninsured motorist. It held
that the insurer had "fiduciary'' responsibilities with respect to its insured, and, if it defended him, to the uninsured motorist as well.

If there were a counterclaim m such a case there
would be, concluded the court, a hopeless conflict since
the insurer would be defending its insured's claim on
the one hand, and have the duty and obligation to defend
the insured on the other.
The conflict of interest "potentially present" in every
case demanded non-intervention. The Texas case, which
had its roots in Holt v. Bell, like its Utah counterpart,
Christensen v. Peterson, s1tpra, which had its roots m
Holt v. Bell, seems to reflect the more rational view.
POINT IV
THE APPELLANT WAS DILATORY IN PROTECTING ITS INTEREST AND IN SERVICING ITS INSURED. A DECISION FOR INTERVENTION
WOULD FORCE THE PLAINTIFF TO UNDERWRITE THE DEFENSE OF HER OWN CLAIM.

The plaintiff, Mrs. Kesler, and the appellant, Transnational Insurance Company, are not strangers. When
it became apparent that h1e~r injuries were serious, Mrs.

15
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Kesler contacted counsel to assist her in negotiating her
claim.
On May 25, 1971, Mrs. Kesler's counsel corresponded
with D. W. Langrock, appellant's agent (R. 51). Provisions were made for a settlement conference which took
place in the latter part of .June, 1971, at counsel's office
(R. 48). Mr. Langrock was furnished with materials
pertaining to the claim and a demand was made (Affidavit, R. 48). The appellant did not respond to the
plaintiff's offer of settlement by saying either yes or
no or by making any counter-offer. On August 26, 1971,
plaintiff's counsel in compliance with paragraph 8 of
the conditions specified in the uninsured motorist coverage endorsement (R. 69) made a demand for arbitration
(R. 52). On September 15, 1971, twenty days after thl'
demand was made, plaintiff had received no response
to the demand for arbitration (R. 49). On September
15, 1971, the demand was withdrawn and the appellant
was informed of impending litigation (R. 53). Under the
terms of Mrs. Kesler's policy, the insurer's consent to
be sued is required before a lawsuit can be commenced.
In connection with the correspondence of September 15,
1971, plaintiff requested consent to litigate the matter.
On October 5, 1971, the date the lawsuit was commenced,
the plaintiff had received no response to her offer of
settlement; no response to her demand for arbitration;
no response to her request for consent to proceed against
the tortfeasors and no response to the threat of impending litigation (Affidavit, R. 48). Basically, Transnational took no steps to protect or safeguard its interests
from the time of the settlement conference in June of
16

1971, to the time of the filing of the motion to intervene
in January of 1972.
On October 5, 1971, the lawsuit was commenced, without appellant's consent and in technical or apparent violation of the terms of the plaintiff's policy. The appellant
was, on October 1, 1971, both sent in the mail and served
with copies of the pleadings (R. 55). Under the applicable rulings of this court, the plaintiff could not join
Transnational as a party. Plaintiff's dilemma, then,
was that she could not sue the appellant directly under
the decisions of this court. She could not sue the tortfeasor under the terms of her policy without Transnational's written consent which she could not acquire (R.,
unmarked, between 68 and 69). Only some three months
after the lawsµit was commenced, after substantial discovery had been completed, did the appellant first move
to intervene and· legally safeguard the interests which
it now deems to be so imminently critical.
If intervention were permitted, Mrs. Kesler would
face one final indignity, that of underwriting the defense
of her own claim. Her own insurer, in direct contradiction to her most personal interests, and to its fiduciary
responsibilities 4 would attempt to defeat the claim arising from the negligence of the uninsured motorist.

':Vhere the uninsured motorist has engaged counsel
and is adequately represented, (nothing in the record or
on this appeal suggests otherwise) the tortf easor's own
4Allstate Insurance Company v. Hunt, Tex Civ App, 450

S. W. 2d 668.
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interests dictate that he be permitted to handle his own
defense. Whereas, .Mrs. Kesler, to be adPquately protected, must locate her own counsel and arrange for his
services, the uninsured motorist (if he had not engaged
counsel) would, if intervention were permitted, be Pnhanced by the qualified efforts of the plaintiff's insurer,
m effect at plaintiff's expense.
Transnational Insurance Company has had numerous
prior opportunities to protect its vital interests, such as
they are, essentially all of which have been imperiously
disregarded. To permit intervention now, under the circumstances, would seriously prejudice the plaintiff and
unfairly privilege the appellant.
POINT V
THE APPLICANT FOR INTERVENTION FAILED
TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF
RULE 24 OF THE UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

A. The Applicant Faifod to File a Pleading Setting
Forth the Claim or Defense for Which Intervention ica~
Sought.
Rule 24( c) as amended provides as follows:

"PROCEDURE. A person desiring to intervene shall serve a motion to intervene upon the
parties as provided in Rule 5. The motions shall
state the grounds therefor and shall be accompanied by a pleading setting forth the claim or
defense for which intervention is sought" (Emphasis supplied).

18

The Utah rule on procedure is similar to the federal
rule. Prior to the enactment of the federal rule, which
served as the model for its Utah counterpart, federal
practice was governed by the principles enunciated in
the 1922 case of Atlantic Refining Co. v. Port Lobos
Petroleum Corp., (D Del 1922) 280 Fed 934. One of those
threshold principles, since incorporated in the federal
and state rules, was the requirement that the petition
must present a well-pleaded defense. In a later case before the United States Supreme Court this was determined to imply that a proposed answer be presented.
Chandler d3 Price v. Brandtje·n d3 Klug, 296 U. S. 53, 56
S. Ct 6, 80 L. Ed 39 ( 1935). Rule 24( c), a 1937 innovation, adopted, in the main, the procedure outlined in the
federal cases. It requires that the applicant for intervention must "in all cases" present his proposed pleading, whether it is defensive, or aggressive. 3 B Moore's
Federal Practice, section 24.12, p. 502. The pleading is
to be served with the motion. 3 B Moore's Federal Practicr, section 24.12, p. 504. The pleading must set forth
the claim or defense for which intervention is sought.
In Re Finger Lakes Land Co., (WD NY 1939) 29 F Supp
50, 1 FR Serv 24c.11, Case 1; Miami County Na.tional
Bank v. Bancroft (CCA 10th, 1941) 121 F. 2d 921, 5 FR
Serv 246.4, Case 1. The moti"'n may not "adopt" the
pleading of an original party Mullins v. De Soto Sec. Co.
(WD La 1942) 2 FRD 502, nor may it merely describe a
future pleading. In the Mullins case the court found
that "under the present rules [24(c)] the application to
intervene is defective if unaccompanied by a proposed
pleading." In that case the motion to intervene did
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contain language whereby the applicants proposect to
adopt the allegations of the petition and the motions of
the original parties.
In the case before the court, Transnational Insurance
Company presented no "well-pleaded defense", served
no answer with its motion, set forth no legal basis for thr
requested intervention, did not purport to adopt the
pleadings, by reference or otherwise, of the original
parties and merely claimed "the right" to file an answer
at some future time.

B. The Application of the Prospective Interverwr

1

i

was Untimely.

Whether intervention is "of right" or "permissive",
an application for intervention must be "timely". (Rules
24(.a) and (b), U.R.C.P., 3 B Moore's Federal Practice,
section 24.13, p. 521). The plaintiff's Complaint was
filed on October 5, 1971 (R. 1). Copies of the pleadings
were at that time served upon the prospective intervenor. Not until January 13, 1972, more than three
months later, was Transnational's Motion for Leave to
Intervene filed with the Court (R. 16). In the interim
period, an Answer was interposed (R. 4), Interrogatories
were served by the plaintiff (R. 5), Answers were received (R. 11), and a Request for Trial Setting was filed
(R. 70). An original party would not have received the
same consideration that the appellant contends it is
entitled to had such original party taken no action for
a three month period. Where a case is substantially
underway when intervention is sought, such intervention
is "tardy" and will "usually be denied." 3 B Moore's
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1

Federal Practice, section 24.13, p. 523. See: Securities
ct Exchange Commission v. Bloomberg, (CA 1st, 1962)
299 F. 2d 315.

C. There Is No Showing Upon Appeal, and There
was None Before the Trial Court, that the Representation of the Appellant's Interests Is or Was bwdequate.
In order for appellant's intervention to be permitted
under the provisions of Rule 24(a), it must be shown
that the representation of its interest by existing parties
is or may be inadequate and that the applicant is or may
be bound by a judgment in the action (Rule 24(a)
U.R.C.P.). Both conditions must be shown to exist before intervention is authorized. Mullins v. De Soto Securities Co., 2 F.R.D. 502 at 504; McDonald v. United
States, (9 Cir.) 119 F. 2d 821. A careful search of the
record in no way indicates that the tortfeasor has failed
to i,,;ecure adequate representation to protect such interei,,;b,:; as the tortfeasor and the appellant jointly have.
Only the statement that counsel for the plaintiff and for
the defendants could stipulate to a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff which might ultimately be paid by Transnational supports this contention (appellant's Brief, p.
10). Even then counsel is hasty to add that, "It should
be made clear that appellant does not contend or allege
that counsel for the parties are going to so act at this
time; however, appellant is subject to that risk."

The tortfeasor defendants have their own incentives
to minimize the recovery or avoid it altogether. Those
incentives are frustrated, as to them, if the insurer is
injrcted into the lawsuit as a named defendant.
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The burden of showing that the representation of its
interest is inadequate is upon the applicant for intervention. 3 B llloore's Federal Practice, section 24.09, p. 31G.
A careful reading of appellant's Brief does not constitut1~
persuasive evidence that this burden has been met.
Consider briefly two other points in this context.
First, the judgment in this matter, if there is one, will
not automatically bind Transnational, the applicant. lt
will be necessary to bring a separate action on a contract
theory before this can be accomplished. Consequently,
the judgment in the action before the Court does not
bind the insurer unless the Court finds that it does in
the subsequent action on the contract.
Second, in theory as in practice, the insurer will ultimately look to the tortfeasor for the payment of the
judgment. Only, as a practical matter, in the event of
the tortfeasor's insolvency is the insurer charged with
the ultimate payment.
Summarizing, there has been no satisfactory showing
that the appellant's interests are inadequately represented or that the applicant for intervention is or may
be bound by "a judgment in thP action" before the Court.
"Even though the applicant may be bound by the judgment, he cannot intervene as of right if he is as a fact
adequately represented by the existing parties to the
action." Lavine and Horning, "Manual of Federal
Practice", p. 346, quoting Moore. The intervenor must
not merely show that there is a possibility that the representation of his interest is inadequate, but that he is
in fact inadequately represented.
22
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--D. The Applicant for Intervention was Not a Proper
Party to the Lawsuit When it was Commenced.
This Court has previously indicated that
" ... a party seeking to intervene in a particular
action should make it appear in his application
for intervention that he would have been at least
a proper party to the action when it was commenced and in which he seeks to intervene, and
that he would have been entitled to the relief he
seeks in a separate action in the same court
against the parties against whom he seeks relief."
Price v. Hansen, 60 U.29, 206 P. 272.
In the case now before the Court, it is inexorably
clear that the plaintiff could not have made the applicant
intervenor a party defendant in any case, however much
desired.

Transnational Insurance Company was not a proper
party to the lawsuit "when it was commenced" and is
not now.

CONCLUSION
In the case before the Court, the appellant failed to
accord the plaintiff with the good faith to be expected of
a fiduciary. In the process, the appellant may have also
failed to protect its own only lately alleged self-interest.
The tortfeasors are adequately proteeted by counsel
of their own choice. The appellant's application for intervention was untimely, inadequately factually sup2::1

ported and defective in failing to comply with the specific requirements of Rule 24 ( c) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
There are serious ethical and conceptual problems
tied to the issue of the intervention of the insurer. 'fhese
problems are theoretically the same whether the issue
is joinder by the insured or intervention by the insurer.
The appellant did not move the Trial Court to obscure its identity. Rather it claimed the "right" as "a
defendant" to "litigate the matter of liability and damages" and to file an answer as if it were a party (R. 16).
The interests of the appellant in this case are adequately protected.
The decision of the Trial Court should be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
JOEL M. ALLRED
610 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Attorney for Resp-O't'1dent

24

